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moral and spiritual crisis in education. His deepest hope was "to develop a
more liberating discourse on the intimate relationships among society, culture, and education" (p. x) by enriching educational theory with a moral and
religious discourse. Ten years later, he gives voice to his own moral outrage
at the continuing intolerable human suffering in the world and in education's
frequent complicity with such suffering.
One criticism of the text is that, as a collection of essays, it is repetitious.
However, this should not dissuade anyone from reading this book. Given the
renewed focus on the social teaching of the Church, Moral Outrage in
Education would make an excellent selection for discussion among educators who might subconsciously assume that the lessons are for someone else.
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BY NATURE EQUAL: THE ANATOMY OF A WESTERN
INSIGHT
JOHN E. COONS AND PATRICK M. BRENNAN. PRINCETON, NJ: PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1999.
Reviewed by George E. Schultze, S.J.

ur culture commonly speaks of human equality without proving that
such equality exists. The Declaration of Independence was based on this
notion and academic and civil leaders defend it, but no one adequately shows
us why we should hold this belief as true. By and large most people believe
in human equality, and subsequently, human rights. However, these rights
will never be firm if they arise from assertions or religious traditions that
others fail to accept. Coons and Brennan attempt to show the truth of human
equality in a fair, conscientious, and scholarly manner. They accept the conventional use of terms like "freedom" and "equality," recognizing the validity of linguistic philosophy, and sympathetically study the works of earlier
westem philosophers and theologians who have investigated the nature of
the human being.
We know that as human beings we are unequal in many ways — height,
appearance, intelligence, and so on. It means little to say that all human
beings are equal because they possess height and intelligence when we know
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that they possess height and intelligence to different degrees. For a useful
understanding of equality, we need to find a common characteristic that all
human beings possess and possess to the same degree. The authors call this
double equality because it occurs in both possession and degree.
The host property that permits us to say all human beings are equal is
"the capacity of every rational person to advance in moral self-perfection
through diligent intention of correct behaviors toward other persons" (p. 13).
This capacity is what makes us all equal and the authors coin the word
"obtend" to underscore the movement toward objective good in an individual's commitment (intention) to do the good. Human beings attempt to reach
self-perfection by intending to achieve the objective of good for themselves
and others; it is in doing the best they can that they become more fully who
they are supposed to be as human beings.
We are, therefore, equal because every person possesses to the same
degree the capacity to achieve the highest kind of moral worth. The twist to
the Coons and Brennan position is that we might fail in our attempts at behaving morally—be moral bunglers—but our objective and good faith intention
is equal to anyone else's objective and good faith intention ("obtension"),
which makes us all equals. Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas would both
argue that moral worth is also dependent on the successful completion of the
objective moral act (achieving our telos), a view that Coons and Brennan
clearly question because some people will succeed to greater and lesser
degrees.
The notion of human equality precedes the advent of democracy. The
host property of human equality can be described by our experience of equality and the common linguistic use of "human equality" (i.e., cultural convention). Unlike some advocates of egalitarianism, the authors argue that equality is the natural state of humanity and not its goal, and in striving for our
self-perfection, human beings come to understand that their fulfillment is
dependent on the completion of their duties and obligations to themselves
and others. At the conclusion of the book, the authors argue that humanity can
only experience liberte and egalite if it has fraternite (i.e., social morality),
completing the triad of the French Revolution. In our present culture's
Hobbesian focus on individuals and their freedom, we have forgotten the
importance of fraternite—mutual obligation or perhaps mutual responsibility. Coons and Brennan further complain of the academe's intellectual gnosticism that insists that doing what is right is always a matter of knowing the
right; thus making it impossible for the less intelligent to achieve full moral
worth. Furthermore, if people always know the right response to a moral
problem, they lose their freedom to some form of determinism. As long as
people have good intentions and act upon them, their moral worth is not
diminished when they make an ignorant response to a moral dilemma.
The authors discuss philosophical positions of Thomas Hobbes, Thomas
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Aquinas, and Immanuel Kant among others. They criticize Hobbes for
describing a human will without limits and for therefore suggesting that
human beings have no duty to anyone but themselves. According to the
authors, Hobbes's mistake was in believing that freedom existed without law.
Coons and Brennan correctly reason that some preinstitutional parameters for
autonomy must already exist before you can begin to have anything close to
democracy. Immanuel Kant rightly separated moral good from all other
forms of human good because the only human good without qualification is
a good will. For example, we believe intelligence is good but without a good
will it can be used for nefarious purposes. Kant's thinking supports the
authors' position because the separation of moral good from every other
human good "is absolutely critical to human equality" (p. 121). Kant's proof
of the pure reason of the noumenon ultimately fails, but the authors are willing to accept the capacity to intend the objective good as equal in every person as supported by convention. In other words, the wider public tends to
believe that we have obligations to one another and we have the ability to try
the best we can to live up to them. Obviously, our society has inherited much
of its conventional view of human equality from the philosophy of Immanuel
Kant.
Coons and Brennan look to the Jesuit philosopher Bernard Lonergan,
S.J., to help them ground morals in nature without making nature the source
of the moral ought, which would mistakenly lead to a moral determinism.
What is objective for Lonergan does not correspond to extemal behavior but
is the result of "fidelity to an intemally given moral order" (p. 136). If we
can never know for sure what is outside our thinking selves, we have to leam
of our moral nature and find its objectivity by finding the support structure
for moral self-perfection within ourselves. Lonergan's philosophy offers a
reasonable explanation for this process.
Lonergan proposes that we know objective reality only by first knowing
our intemality (our subjective selves). As conscious beings, we experience
data, at some level we understand the data, we judge the worth of the data we
receive, and then we make a decision to respond in a specific way. When we
decide to act, we have clearly become self-conscious. This simple description
of the self is necessarily true because anyone who might attempt to refute it
would have to rely on experience, understanding, and judgment to decide it
was untrue. This subjective interaction with the wider reality of our experience is the spontaneous movement of the human spirit. Our desire to answer
the ever-present questions about our meaning and what we are to do is only
satisfied by adherence to the "transcendental precepts" that call from within:
experience attentively, understand intelligently, judge reasonably, and decide
responsibly. The ultimate norm for life is simply a part of who we are as individuals and not wholly immanent. Human beings by their nature need to
adhere faithfully to the transcendental precepts. The importance of Lonergan
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to Coons and Brennan's belief in human equality lies in each human being's
adherence to these precepts that result in objectivity. It is from our interior
fidelity to these precepts, our "authentic subjectivity," that objectivity
becomes possible. Human beings desire what is real and so their desire transcends their subjective interiority. Moral objectivity occurs because individuals can make authentic judgments.
The question of whether people have the equal capacity to achieve objectivity in their moral judgments has been transmuted into the question of
whether they have the same capacity to be authentic, and the answer seems
to be yes. Moving the basis of ethics in from the extemal to the internal world
dissolves the problem of "equal access." Once objectivity's norms are internal, everyone can know and satisfy them. The principle is not correspondence
to the extemal but fidelity to the internally given transcendental precepts (p.
140).
To be authentic, which also means attaining objective moral self-perfection, we must try the best we can. No one can plead a lack of knowledge or
insight when having to respond to an ethical dilemma. This does not threaten but instead assures equality, because it never requires of the subject that
he do more than heed the inner commands to be attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible" (p. 140). Obviously, to heed the inner commands is a
challenge that will not countenance moral laxity.
After a very short discussion of virtue ethics. Coons and Brennan draw a
framework for a Christian obstensionalism. The authors discuss both
Protestant and Catholic theological traditions and the various ways theologians have disputed the relationships between freedom, choice, and grace and
their influence or lack of influence on salvation. They find that St. Thomas
Aquinas's natural law views do not permit an obstentional understanding of
equality because St. Thomas did not believe that a person's will was good
when it erred in reason, even when the individual had tried to do his best (i.e.,
ignorance is no excuse). The authors, however, find St. Alphonsus Liguori
(the founder of the Redemptorists), Cardinal John Henry Newman, and the
spirit of Vatican II to be promoters of views that are supportive of obstensionalism. To Liguori, a person who diligently attempts to do the good but
fails acquires some merit for his attempt. Cardinal Newman's awareness of
the limits of our knowledge when making moral decisions has led contemporary moral theologians to reason that if the institutional Church can make
mistakes in reason at times, then individuals should not be faulted for making reasonable mistakes. Finally, Vatican II moved further along a path to the
universal economy of salvation because the person who makes a commitment
to God is trying the best he can.
Those who, through no fault of their own, do not know the Gospel—but
who nevertheless seek God with a sincere heart and, moved by grace, try in
their actions to do his will as they know it through the dictates of their con-

546

Catholic Education/June 2000

science—those too [may attain] etemal salvation (Lumen gentium, sec. 16 as
cited in Coons and Brennan).
The authors conclude that Veritatis Splendor and the Gatechism of the
Gatholic Ghurch are less supportive of their view of equality based on
obstension because Pope John Paul II, while affirming objective morality,
never suggests that one is moral by trying one's best, although the person's
"dignity" may remain intact. After reviewing both Protestant and Catholic
writings, the authors have made a good case for descriptive human equality
in the Christian tradition.
Coons and Brennan conclude their work by underscoring the fact that
community can occur only where all human beings have an equal capacity for
moral self-perfection. One can provide exceptions where some elites feel
they have community to the exclusion of others, so the authors concede that
their description does not satisfy conventional use of "community." But this
should not prevent communitarians from trying to publicize their usage of
community, which necessarily includes the capacity for moral selfperfection. To further this goal, the writers suggest that the Catholic world
provides an "important illustration" of the relationship between equality and
community. The Church sees itself as an exclusive community that has
authoritative moral rules, and a recognition of the institutional goveming
structure is a prerequisite to membership. In addition, the Church members,
because of an acceptance of "universal moral equality," must accept the outsider's freedom, the non-believer's freedom, to refiect on the Church's moral
understandings and reject them. Catholics have an obligation to lay a bridge
to outsiders in expanding their community, but they are to respect the nonbelievers' decisions. Ironically, even if the non-believer rejects the Catholic
position, a universal community still exists because the Catholic respects any
decision made in good conscience. Human equality is maintained in a pluralistic world.
By Nature Equal is a beautifully written book that provides much fodder
for philosophers, theologians, lawyers, and any Catholics who take their faith
seriously. A Catholic can accept the equality of human beings as a matter of
revelation or through philosophical reflection, perhaps using some form of
natural law. The beauty of this work, however, comes from the thoughtful
arguments that will necessarily engage non-believers, either helping them
become part of the Christian faith community as believers or simply encouraging them as fellow travelers on our common joumey of moral selfperfection. The Catholic educator will find the groundwork for support in
evangelical efforts and interfaith dialogue through education—not a heavyhanded evangelism, of course, but one of common good will and Christian
neighbor-love.
This reviewer's one concem is that Coons and Brennan fail to give a full
discussion of contemporary neo-Aristotlean virtue ethics that may come
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close to describing an authentic route to moral self-perfection. Virtue ethics,
and particularly neo-Aristotlean virtue ethics as espoused by Alasdair
Mclntyre and Stanley Hauerwaus, authors that Coons and Brennan cite,
clearly require moral decision-making to lead to action. Contrary to the
authors' assertion, the state of virtue is not a passive one. Furthermore, the
"self-perfection" of Coons and Brennan, which requires our participation
with others, might be another stab at describing our telos. This, of course,
becomes important to Catholic educators because the narrative that they live
and teach their students says something about their end as a faith community. This element of narrative is not strongly promoted by Coons and Brennan
because they cite good Catholic sources that underscore the economy of universal salvation. Clearly, we all try our best to reach our end, but ultimately
we are dependent on God to gift us with it. God perfects us. To say the least
about this fine philosophical work, we must thank the authors for giving us
good reason to believe that we are all by our nature equal, assuring us of a
universal community.
George E. Schultze, S.J., is assistant professor of social ethics at the University of San Franci.sco.

